Surprisingly, the addition of the obligation to "ensure respect" did not arouse much interest or discussion at the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 nor indeed at the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-77. 8 For a long time, scholars also tended to neglect this peculiar provision. 9 More recently, however, the obligation to respect and to ensure respect for IHL has attracted more scholarly attention, notably as a possible overarching source of restraint on conduct not specifically regulated by existing rules of IHL.
The scholarship has focused mainly on the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, rather than on the more obvious obligation to respect it. Indeed, the latter obligation merely gives expression to the general principle of pacta sunt servanda, which was hardly in need of repeating even in 1929. As such, the scope of the obligation to respect IHL is quite clear and for the most part settled: it requires nothing more of States than to ensure that their own organs comply with IHL. 10 In contrast to the obligation to respect, the obligation to ensure respect is not so easily defined. It has been the subject of two very different interpretations.
11
According to one school of thought, which takes a broad view of the obligation to ensure respect, States are required to take all appropriate measures to ensure that IHL is observed universally, including by other States and by non-State actors operating in other States. 12 The competing (narrow) view holds that the obliga- . However, exponents of this view provide no rationale for their contention and there appears to be no basis for it in either the negotiating history or in the texts themselves. As will be seen below, the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 referred to the duty to ensure respect for IHL by the population exclusively in connection with the obligation to "ensure respect." One can only speculate that the reason for referring to the population under the chapeau of the obligation to respect is to exclude it from the obligation to ensure respect so as to create the impression that the latter obligation must have been intended to apply more broadly. Kalshoven concludes that, beyond the legal obligation of States to impose respect for IHL on their armed forces, their population and groups under their control, there is only a moral duty to endeavour to ensure universal respect for IHL.
21
Proponents of the broad interpretation have taken little notice of Kalshoven's pointed critique. According to Eric David, the obligation to ensure universal respect for IHL cannot be of a merely moral order since the language of common Article 1 is prescriptive, not hortatory. 22 This argument misses the point entirely. Kalshoven clearly recognises that common Article 1 expresses a legal obligation; what he disputes is the claim that this obligation is universal in scope. In other words, the dispute is not over the nature (legal or moral) of the obligation to ensure respect, but rather over the scope of the legal obligation. Kalshoven shows that common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol I were never intended to create a legal obligation to ensure universal respect for IHL. The fact that he recognises the existence of a moral duty to do so (based on the "moral order" that underlies IHL) in no way detracts from his conclusion.
Other proponents of the broad interpretation dismiss Kalshoven's critique as a "minor consideration" and argue that the subsequent practice of States confirms their interpretation of the obligation to ensure respect. 23 While they concede that very little evidence of State practice can actually be adduced in this regard, 24 they speculate that this may be due to the preference of States to act discreetly, through diplomatic channels, rather than taking ostentatious measures to ensure compliance with IHL by others. Thus, they imply that there may in fact be sufficient State practice to establish the existence of a legally binding duty to ensure universal respect for IHL. 25 This attempt at salvaging the broad interpretation appears to rest on Article 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that in interpreting a treaty account must be taken of "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."
26 Article 31(3)(b) sets a very high standard; it requires that all parties to a treaty, if not actually engaged in the subsequent practice, must at least accept it or acquiesce to it. 27 Any contrary State practice is therefore fatal to an argument based on Article 31(3)(b). In this case, such contrary State practice clearly exists. There are, for instance, domestic court decisions expressly rejecting the broad interpretation.
28 There is also, as indicated above, evidence of 23 See e.g. 
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State opposition to resolutions affirming the broad interpretation.
29
Even in the absence of this contrary State practice, however, it would be difficult to argue that States had acquiesced to the broad interpretation. Acquiescence, as Ian Brownlie succinctly puts it, is "the absence of protest when this might reasonably be expected."
30 Or, to use I.C. MacGibbon's definition, acquiescence consists of "silence or absence of protest in circumstances which generally call for a positive reaction signifying an objection."
31 Those circumstances include above all a certain notoriety of practice. 32 A practice that is engaged in discreetly or secretly on a bilateral level, as is alleged to be the case here, would not be known to the generality of States and would not afford them an opportunity to protest. The silence of States in such circumstances could not be interpreted as tacit agreement with the broad interpretation. Furthermore, even if such practice existed and came to the knowledge of some States, their silence might reasonably result from mere indifference. As will be seen below, there is no reason to believe that a meaningful number of States subscribes to the broad interpretation. In such circumstances, it would be entirely reasonable for the great majority of States not to feel compelled to dispute the minority's understanding of the law.
Antionio Cassese seems to be aware of this weakness and relies instead on Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, which allows recourse to "supplementary means of interpretation." 33 This variant, however, is no more persuasive than the first. While subsequent practice which does not meet the requirements of Article 31(3)(b) may nevertheless be taken into consideration as a supplementary means of interpretation, 34 Article 32 should not be used to circumvent Article 31(3)(b). If subsequent practice is insufficient to produce a certain result under Article 31(3)(b) because of the existence of contrary State practice (as in this case), then it must also be insufficient to produce that result under Article 32. To argue otherwise would be to accept that a treaty may be modified through subsequent practice over the objection of one or more State parties. Such use of subsequent practice would be completely at odds with the basic principle of consent. Mention should also be made of the interpretative principle of in dubio mitius, which like Article 32 applies in cases of ambiguity. It provides that "[i]f the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties. the stark practical implication of requiring States to ensure universal respect for IHL. An even more fundamental flaw in the "subsequent practice" argument is the assumption that the necessary State practice actually exists. It is trite law that one may not rely on such assumptions even if the practice in question is alleged to be secret. Whether for the purposes of treaty law or custom, the existence of State practice must always be established. Moreover, it is not clear why evidence of State practice in this area should be particularly difficult to find in the first place. Indeed, if the obligation to ensure respect for IHL were in fact universal in scope and "universally accepted" as such by States, as claims Cassese, 36 each and every armed conflict (or at least each and every armed conflict that involved violations of IHL) would elicit some kind of response by each and every State. Even if the response in question were nothing more than a discreet diplomatic démarche (which is the least that each and every State would presumably be required to do), the resulting practice would be too abundant to miss. Given the sheer volume of the practice, at least some of it would eventually and inevitably find its way into the public domain. 37 There is, for instance, abundant evidence of espionage 38 -an eminently secret activity. In any event, it is a mistake to assume that all States would in all cases prefer to pursue quiet diplomacy; it stands to reason that in some cases States would find it in their interest publicly to invoke their duty to ensure universal respect for IHL (if they thought that such a duty existed) as a pretext for censuring or taking coercive measures against other States or foreign non-State actors. States may also consider public statements to be more effective than quiet diplomacy in certain circumstances or may want publicly to demonstrate their support for IHL. 39 Accordingly, the admitted paucity of State practice cannot be explained on the basis of the secretive nature of diplomacy. A much more likely explanation is that States simply do not subscribe to the broad interpretation.
It bears mention also that proponents of the broad interpretation are not helped by the several instances in which the United Nations [UN] has called upon parties to a conflict to respect IHL and in which UN member States have contributed troops to peacekeeping missions or UN-authorised interventions. Such practice is more consistent with the obligation of States, pursuant to Article [T]ake collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
42
It is no coincidence that all of these provisions apply only in respect of serious violations of international law and that they authorize only collectively-sanctioned actions. The absence of similar language from common Article 1 is further proof that the High Contracting Parties never intended to create a broader obligation to ensure universal respect for IHL. It also bears mention that while Article 89 refers to serious violations of IHL that have already occurred or are occurring, the broad interpretation of common Article 1 would require States to take such measures as they can to prevent violations. 40 
III. THE OBLIGATION TO RESPECT AND TO ENSURE RESPECT UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
In view of the general recognition (even on the part of broad interpretation proponents) that evidence of State practice is lacking, it is surprising to find that the authors of the recent ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law 43 present the broad interpretation as an established rule of customary IHL and claim that evidence in support of it is "overwhelming." The broad interpretation is summed up in the second sentence of Rule 144 of the Study, which reads as follows:
States may not encourage violations of international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. They must exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law.
The commentary to rule 144 begins with a discussion of common Article 1. It reiterates the ICRC's long-standing position that common Article 1 is a source of obligation for all High Contracting Parties (not just those involved in an armed conflict) and "includes the requirement that States do all in their power to ensure that international humanitarian law is respected universally." 44 The commentary goes on to assert that "State practice shows an overwhelming use of (i) diplomatic protest and (ii) collective measures through which States exert their influence, to the degree possible, to try to stop violations of [IHL] ." 45 Unfortunately, the ICRC has made it very difficult to verify this claim. As the commentary explains, evidence of State practice in support of rule 144 is catalogued throughout the Study "in the context of the various rules covered by [it]" -presumably because the practice was too "overwhelming" to catalogue in one place. The decision to proceed in this way is puzzling given that the ICRC must have been aware that scholars had so far failed to produce convincing evidence of State practice in this regard and that the matter was contentious. In fact, even ICRC officials had in the past admitted that such evidence was insufficient or at least inconclusive. Hans-Peter Gasser, writing in his personal capacity, stated not so long ago that it was "difficult to draw conclusions from the practice of governments" and that no "clear" or "hard" evidence of State practice had emerged in this area. 46 He concluded that:
[A] brief look at the behaviour of governments leaves no doubt that they do not feel themselves to be under a legal obligation to act if humanitarian law is being flouted by a party to an armed conflict. If third parties actually do act, they do so if and when they feel that a démarche is also in their own interest or if public pressure at home is such that to act seems wiser than to run counter to public opinion. 47 Cornelio Sommaruga expressed a similar view while serving as President of the ICRC. He opined that States had only a moral obligation to act if other States violated IHL, which in his view was "even more important" than having a legal obligation to do so. 48 These comments bring us to the issue of opinio juris, of which there is scarcely any mention in the commentary to rule 144. In considering this issue it is important to keep in mind that rule 144 comprises two sentences each of which articulates a separate norm. The first sentence of rule 144 sets out a prohibition against encouraging violations of IHL by parties to an armed conflict, while the second sentence refers to a positive obligation of States to exert their influence to the degree possible to stop such violations. This distinction is important because, as stated in the introduction to the Study, the manner of assessing the existence of a customary rule "may well differ depending on whether the rule involved contains a prohibition, an obligation or merely a right to behave in a certain manner." 49 In the case of a right, it may be sufficient to show that States do not object when others act in a certain way. 50 Prohibitions, on the other hand, require positive evidence of opinio juris, particularly where the underlying State practice consists primarily of abstentions (i.e. compliance with the prohibition). Such evidence might consist of protests against violations of a prohibition or of declarations by States to the effect that certain conduct is prohibited. Positive evidence of opinio juris is arguably even more important in the context of obligations in order to distinguish the underlying State practice from mere courtesy or comity. As the authors of the Study observe:
The fact that it is a legal requirement, rather than one reflecting courtesy or comity, can be found by either an expression of the need for such behaviour, or by criticism by other States in the absence of such behaviour. It may also be that, following criticism by other States, the criticised State will explain its abstinence by seeking justification within the rule. 53 What the authors mean, presumably, is that in some cases the protesting State had invoked its own obligation under common Article 1 as the reason for its protest. Such references to common Article 1 would indeed constitute evidence of opinio juris in support of an obligation to ensure universal respect for IHL. Not a single example of such a protest is provided, however. Furthermore, the authors do not explain whether the remaining protests disclosed any similar evidence of opinio juris. There is no consideration of the possibility that these protests may have been motivated by extra-legal considerations.
Another difficulty which appears to have been overlooked by the authors of the Study is that declarations consistent with the existence of a norm are often contradicted by the actual practice of the very States making those declarations. Recent attempts by Switzerland to regulate private military and security companies [PMSCs] offer an interesting case in point. In 2005, the Swiss Federal Council published a report on PMSCs in which it explicitly recognized the existence of an obligation, based on common Article 1, to ensure universal respect for IHL. 54 According to the report, States "have to ensure … that the private security companies which they deploy in conflict situations, which are based in their state or which are operational on their territory, respect international humanitarian law." 55 The Council seemed to reverse itself, however, in May 2008 when it decided to not regulate Swiss exports of private military and security services. 56 Among the reasons cited for this decision were the "minor importance" of the Swiss PMSC industry and the difficulty of enforcing legislation extraterritorially. The Council noted also that "with the exception of the USA and South Africa, no major provider state governs the export of military and security services beyond its existing legislation on arms." The Council made no reference, however, to IHL and did not attempt to reconcile its decision to not regulate with its earlier finding that it was obliged to do so. Interestingly, the Council referred to the size of the Swiss PMSC industry only in connection with 53 
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"the risk of incidents that might have a detrimental effect on the foreign and security policy or the neutrality" of Switzerland 57 -it did not cite it as a factor justifying non-regulation at international law.
The Swiss Federal Council's characterisation of the industry's importance as "minor" is in itself interesting. According to a report by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF], which had been commissioned by the Swiss government to study the Swiss PMSC industry and explore regulatory options, there were in 2007 no fewer than 23 Swiss firms "that have worked, or seek to work, beyond Western Europe and North America." 58 The expression "beyond Western Europe and North America" was a euphemism coined by the DCAF to accommodate PMSCs that might have been reluctant to admit that they had, or were seeking, contracts in conflict zones. 59 Even so, of the 23 firms identified by the DCAF, only twelve agreed to participate in the study, making any conclusions about the industry as a whole necessarily tentative. The Swiss government, however, appears not to have been overly concerned with the resulting uncertainty about the nature and extent of activities undertaken by Swiss PMSCs. A report by the Federal Office of Justice concluded simply that the refusal of some firms to participate in the DCAF study did not warrant the inference that they were active in conflict zones or had anything to hide from the authorities.
60
This approach was in stark contrast to the concern voiced by the Council in its 2005 report. There, the Council noted that just in the canton of Basel-Landschaft (by no means the largest or most populous of Switzerland's 26 cantons) there were three firms "known to be operating in war zones or crisis areas" and twelve more which had informed the authorities that they were considering such work. 61 The Council found that while there still were "not many Swiss-based private security companies operating in crisis zones abroad" there were indications that "such activities [were] likely to grow in importance." 62 Viewing the Council's decision to not regulate in light of its 2005 Report, one is left with the distinct impression that Swiss authorities had, by 2007, somehow lost all desire to regulate PMSCs and did not want to be persuaded otherwise by looking too deeply into their activities. The decision to not regulate PMSCs appears to have been dictated by policy considerations and to have had little, if anything, to do with international law.
The criticised.
63 Iain Scobbie, for instance, has observed that there appears to be a divergence between the "classic" approach to assessing the existence of customary international law as described in the introduction to the Study and "the less stringent methodology which actually appears to have been employed" in the context of particular rules. 64 Scobbie's observation certainly applies in this case. Another criticism levelled against rule 144 is that the expression "to the degree possible" makes it "too uncertain to be admitted as a norm of customary international law." 65 This concern appears to be exaggerated, however, given the decision of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] in the Case concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention. 66 There, the Court interpreted the undertaking to prevent genocide 67 as requiring States "to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible" and recognised that this obligation "varies greatly from one State to another" depending on "the capacity [of each State] to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide." 68 Notwithstanding the inherent difficultly of applying such a vague norm, the Court was able to conclude that the Federal Republic of Serbia had breached its obligation to prevent genocide by failing to take any steps to prevent the Srebrenica massacre. 69 In light of this judgment, it would seem that the second sentence of rule 144 (requiring States to "exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law") is not so unclear and imprecise as to be invalid as a legal norm.
It remains, however, that the second sentence of rule 144 is terribly vague, which makes it unlikely for States to be found in violation of it so long as they at least refrain from encouraging violations of IHL. It is interesting to note in United States was required to take any positive steps to stop violations of IHL by the contras. The Court did not suggest that the United States should have made use of its influence in order to ensure or promote respect for IHL by the contras. The United States' only obligation, in view of the Court, was not to encourage such violations. Interestingly, the Court found that the United States had breached this obligation in only one respect, namely, by supplying the contras with a manual on psychological warfare, which explicitly advocated conduct that is prohibited under IHL.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. There, the Court held that Israel's violations of erga omnes obligations created certain obligations for all States. The Court again framed these obligations in negative terms, stating that "[a]ll States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction." 75 The Court held that in addition to these obligations, all States Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention had also "the duty to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention." 76 Interestingly, the Court did not specify what (if anything) this duty entailed beyond the negative obligations not to recognize and not to assist. There is no indication that the Court had in mind positive obligations. On the contrary, given the specific mention of negative obligations in the very same paragraph, it is fair to assume that the Court would have mentioned any positive obligations if it were of the view that such obligations existed. Indeed, proponents of the broad interpretation have criticised this aspect of the Court's decision and have been at pains to explain it. 77 This interpretation of the Court's Advisory Opinion is consistent with the submissions of States participating in the case. Of the eight interveners that addressed the issue, only the League of Arab States 78 (acting apparently in its own capacity and not on behalf of its member States) and Egypt 79 suggested that third parties had a positive duty, based on common Article 1, to ensure respect for the Third Geneva Convention by Israel. Palestine, the party with the greatest interest in advancing the law on this point, also referred to common Article 1 but did not interpret it as requiring third parties to take any positive steps to 
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Respecting and Ensuring Respect for IHL 267 ensure respect for the Convention. 80 While Palestine argued that third States had an "obligation to cooperate with each other and with the responsible international bodies, with a view to putting an end to Israel's violations," it based this obligation on Draft Article 40 on the Responsibility of States, which, as mentioned above, deals only with situations of serious violations of jus cogens. 81 Saudi Arabia suggested that the obligations of third parties were limited to enacting penal sanctions for persons committing grave breaches of the Convention and to prosecuting such persons. 82 Jordan and Indonesia, relying apparently on Article 2 of the UN Charter, argued that third States had certain obligations as Members of the United Nations, including the obligation to recognise the illegality of the situation and to take lawful measures to bring it to an end. 83 Sweden referred to Draft Article 16 on the Responsibility of States and stated that "third states must not aid or assist Israel in its measures." 84 Finally, Pakistan stated, without elaborating, that "[t]he international community has an obligation to prevent unlawful annexation of Palestinian land." 85 These submissions show that proponents of the broad interpretation were in the minority. Furthermore, the variety of views expressed may explain why the Court did not venture to create new law by recognising the existence of a customary rule requiring States to ensure universal respect for IHL. Accordingly, it appears that the Court's Advisory Opinion is entirely consistent with its earlier decision in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities.
These decisions may be contrasted with the more recent judgment of the Court in the Case concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention. 86 Of interest for our purposes is the part of the Judgment that deals with the obligation to prevent genocide. This obligation is codified in Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 87 which provides as follows:
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
The Court reiterated that the obligation to prevent genocide "is not territorially limited by the Convention." 88 It further stated that the obligation to prevent genocide is one of conduct and requires States Parties to the Convention "inter alia, to employ the means at their disposal …to prevent persons or groups not directly under their authority from committing an act of genocide." 89 This duty, according to the Court, requires a State to act the instant it "learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed." 90 In applying the law to the facts, the Court found that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) met both of the requirements of Article 1. First, it enjoyed a position of influence over the persons who perpetrated the genocide in Srebrenica "owing to the strength of the political, military and financial links between the FRY on the one hand and the Republika Srpska and the VRS [Army of the Republika Srpska] on the other."
91 Second, the Court concluded that the authorities of the FRY "could hardly have been unaware of the serious risk of [genocide] once the VRS forces had decided to occupy the Srebrenica enclave." 92 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the authorities of the FRY should have "made the best efforts within their power to try and prevent the tragic events then taking shape."
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The Case concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention demonstrates that the Court can be quite liberal and progressive in its interpretation of treaty provisions of a humanitarian character and that it is not on principle opposed to recognising an obligation to make best efforts (similar to the second sentence of rule 144), despite the inherent vagueness of such an obligation, if it considers it to have a rational basis in the text of the treaty. 94 Far from assisting proponents of the broad interpretation, this aspect of the decision suggests that the Court had good reason not to interpret common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions in a similarly expansive fashion in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities and in its Advisory Opinion on the Wall. In particular, it will be recalled that the relationship between the United States and the contras in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities was not unlike the relationship between the FRY and the VRS in the Case concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention.
It follows from this analysis that the second sentence of rule 144 is not a correct statement of the law. As already demonstrated, the proposition that States "must exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law" does not reflect the intention of the High Contracting Parties and is not supported by subsequent State practice or case law. 
